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I. INTRODUCTION
Will the Trump impeachments inspire a flurry of future presidential
impeachments? Will the second Trump impeachment, which occurred
after the President left office, spur impeachments of lesser, former
government officials? These and other questions emerged during the 2022
Missouri Law Review Symposium and on the Senate floor during the
Trump impeachment trials. I have argued that we can make an educated
prognosis about these possibilities based on constitutional structure. I
called this argument the “political safeguards” of impeachment in my
recent book, The Impeachments of Donald Trump: An Introduction to
Constitutional Argument.1 What I called political safeguards, invoking
the great legal scholar Professor Herbert Wechsler,2 are easily described
as constitutional safeguards. They are political in the sense that they are
part of our democracy, and not political in the sense that they are lawless
or partisan. In this short Article, I expand on this claim, arguing that these
“political” safeguards emerge from what Professor Charles Black called
basic constitutional structures and relationships.3
This claim may sound oxymoronic for many readers. How can
politics be a safeguard? Politics is the problem, not the solution.4 Won’t
the President’s political opponents have an incentive to impeach,
particularly in a highly polarized age? Won’t all those chants of “lock her
up” lead to impeachments of unpopular political figures like former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, long after she has left office? These
claims assume a much too simple model of American politics, and an
incomplete view of our Constitution. Congress’s constitutional structure
operates as a disincentive to party unity.5 Absent egregious enough action
1

VICTORIA NOURSE, THE IMPEACHMENTS OF DONALD TRUMP: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT (2021) [hereinafter TRUMP
IMPEACHMENTS].
2
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).
3
See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). Admittedly, the electoral relationships to which I look
are different in some respects from those to which Professor Black looked.
4
As I argue, TRUMP IMPEACHMENTS, supra note 1, at 17–19, it is very important
to distinguish between various meanings of the word “political.” Some use the term
to mean naked partisanship, others to mean particular policy preferences, and still
others the demands of electoral office. It is always wise to remember that our
Constitution creates a political order we call “democracy” which would not exist
without political relationships known as representation.
5
Some contend that the separation of powers is a separation of parties not
branches. I believe that view is incomplete for the reasons expressed by myself and
others. See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, 28–35 (2019); see also Matthew Stephenson & Jide
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to unite a disunited country, I do not believe we will see a spiral of
impeachments. Why? The costs of impeachment for Congress, both as
an institution and for individual members, are high. To be sure, in a deeply
divided nation, worries abound. Unforeseen cataclysms may defeat the
most solid of predictions. But there are reasons that, in a post-pandemic
era, impeachment fury may wither, even if politics at large remains
viciously partisan. My point: those reasons lie in the Constitution’s
structure.
In Part II, I explain the “constitutive Constitution.” Lawyers tend not
to understand the Constitution as creating a government as opposed to
limiting it. Focused firmly on courts, they mistake a part of the
Constitution for its whole: most of the Constitution is political in the sense
that it creates representative institutions. The prime reason for the 1787
Convention was not the creation of courts (otherwise the country would
have perished long ago). It was the creation of a popularly-elected
government, divided principally in two departments6: the legislature and
the executive. In Part III, I explain why the constitutive Constitution
makes it difficult to impeach. I focus on institutional reasons that make
impeachment costly. These reasons can all be traced to the constitutional
text, just not the text that most consider constitutional “law.” In Part IV, I
apply these lessons to argue that the second Trump impeachment trial
(which occurred after the President left office) will not lead to the
impeachment of former officials such as former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton or former Attorney General William Barr. I conclude that this is
unlikely to happen because of Congress’s more pressing electoral
incentives, which are built into the Constitution’s structural preference for
local geography.

II. THE CONSTITUTIVE CONSTITUTION
When the Framers sat down to write a document creating a new
government, they focused on creating a government that would work. In
1787, the existing government was in shambles, leaving the nation in
danger. “The founders had just broken free from one empire, and the idea
that some other empire was going to swallow them up was a constant

Nzelibe, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and
Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 517 (2010) (arguing that we have a
separation of voters as much as a separation of parties).
6
I use the term “department” as the Framers did because we have three
departments. One of those departments, the Congress, is divided into two “branches.”
Two Bodies, One Branch, U.S. CAPITOL VISITOR CTR. (last visited May 28, 2022),
https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/about-congress/two-bodies-one-branch
[https://perma.cc/VKH4-BKK7].
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source of fear for them,” explains historian Mary Sarah Bilder.7 The
Articles of Confederation had failed to unite the country or pay its debts.
The Framers needed a new a government. Courts were the least of the
Founders’ worries. That explains why Article I creates a Congress and
Article II a Presidency.8 A working democracy requires rule by the people.
Voters are the essence of democracy and that is why the Framers spent an
inordinate amount of time in the summer of 1787 on who would vote for
whom to create the Congress and the Presidency.9
The reason that I call these provisions the “constitutive Constitution”
is because this is what the Framers were doing: they were constituting a
government. We call the Constitution a “Constitution” rather than a
“contract” or a “debt” or a “prayer” for a reason: it calls into existence
something that did not exist before. Although the Framers were sent to
“revise” the Articles of Confederation,10 they quickly found themselves
proposing grander plans to address the nation’s urgent needs. A new
constitutional structure dominated the convention.
For example,
constituting Congress was a major question: was there to be one chamber
or two? Often, the Framers looked to the failures of the state constitutions

7
The Founding Fathers Feared Foreign Influence — And Devised Protections
Against It, HISTORY (last visited May 28, 2022), https://www.history.com/news/
foreign-influence-constitution-founding-fathers
[https://perma.cc/6HTD-KJVT].
Professor Bilder is author of MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (Harvard 2017).
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members chosen every second year by the people of the several states. . . .”); id. at art.
I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
state, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one
vote.”); id. at art. II, § 1.
9
To give just two examples, consider the following. The Virginia Plan, which
in amended form became our Constitution, originally provided that the Senate was to
be elected by the House: “members of the second branch of the National Legislature
ought to be elected by those of the first....” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (recording the May 29,
1787, resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia). The New Jersey Plan,
a competing proposal, provided that the executive be appointed by the Congress. See
id. at 20 (“Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National
Legislature for the term of years . . . .”). For a more complete account, see Victoria
Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist
Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1996) [hereinafter “Due
Foundation”]; Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L. J. 749
(1999) [hereinafter “Vertical Separation”].
10
Richard R. Beeman, The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Revolution in
Government, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (last visited April 26, 2022),
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/white-papers/theconstitutional-convention-of-1787-a-revolution-in-government
[https://perma.cc/MC28-TXU4].
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to decide.11 And they ultimately decided on a bicameral approach with
two different kinds of constituencies: states (then, the state legislature)
would elect the Senate and smaller geographic and population units that
we now call districts would elect the House. These were the kind of
structural questions preoccupying the Framers in drafting Article I,
although one might not know that from constitutional law classes which
tend to focus on limits on Congress’s powers (i.e., Section 8’s limits),12
not how Congress is elected.
For much of the Constitutional Convention, how to elect the
President was unresolved. Some favored a multiple chief executive,
whereas some favored a single President with a council. But the most
important decision about the Presidency was not about whether there
would be a single or multiple executive. The most important decision –
one not decided until nearly the end of the convention – was to give the
President a national constituency, mediated by an electoral college. For
much of the Constitutional Convention, Congress was to elect the
President. That would have created, in essence, a parliamentarian
government. In the parliamentary system, such as the one in Britain,
members of the Parliament form a “government,” meaning that members
of the legislature sit in the executive branch.13 Today, that would mean
the current Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, would serve
simultaneously in the Executive. In a parliamentary form of government,
the “party” elected is the driving force uniting members of the legislature
and the executive (for example, in Britain, the “Labor Party” or the
“Conservative Party” rules). The Framers did not like the idea of parties
or “factions” as they called them. Had they adopted a system in which the
President was elected by Congress, it would have bound the two
institutions together as they are bound in parliamentarian systems. The
President would have looked to Congress, and to curry favor with its
members, if he sought re-election.
When the Framers, at the Convention, finally rejected congressional
election of the President, they made the President independent from
Congress. That, in turn, created the separation of powers.14 Had the
11

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (discussing the failures of
state constitutions to guarantee the separation of powers even when they had express
provisions requiring separate powers).
12
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (providing that Congress has certain “powers” such as
the power to regulate commerce).
13
See TRUMP IMPEACHMENTS, supra note 1, at 68–69 (discussing the difference
between parliamentarian systems and our separation of powers).
14
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison). Note that Madison writes
that the Virginia Governor and council legislature, which were elected by the
legislature exemplified the failure of the separation of powers in the states. Id. at 37
(“the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are appointable by the
legislature; . . . two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of
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President been elected by the House and the Senate, the President would
have had an incentive to cultivate House and Senate members. In effect,
those who elected the House and Senate members would elect the
President. The Founders created a different system: the President was to
have an independent, national constituency. As Gouverneur Morris
expressed it, had the President been elected by the House and the Senate,
the President would have spent all his time in Washington seeking favor
from members of Congress.15 A national constituency encouraged the
President to represent those outside of Washington.16 Indeed, since
electoral college votes determined the outcome, the President would have
an incentive to cultivate those states with the most Senators and
Representatives—the most populous states.
It is possible to see any Constitution as purely constitutive, meaning
only constituting the political departments. Other countries’ traditions
have done so.17 In such a world, the Constitution is not enforced by courts
as law, but is a guide for the legislature and the executive. But, in the
United States, from the earliest days, courts asserted the notion that a
“written” constitution required legal enforcement.18 Notice, however, that
it does not follow that a Constitution enforced as law (the “juridical”
Constitution) is one that does not create a government (what I am calling
the “constitutive” Constitution). Although this goes without saying, a
Constitution that only had courts would have no voters. If that were our
Constitution, the Chief Justice would serve as a legal autocrat. Today, we
have both a constitutive Constitution and a legal/juridical Constitution,
operating simultaneously.
If this is correct, then we must recognize that the Constitution creates
institutions and it creates political relationships between voters and
institutions essential to constitutional structure. The Congress is a multimember body; each member represents a different group of citizens in
particular geographic areas. Those who care about the Constitution’s text
should not fear this is political theory divorced from text, since the text
itself creates this arrangement. These provisions are generally forgotten

the legislature; and . . . all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled
by the same department.”).
15
2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 500
(Sept. 2, 1787) (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
16
One might argue that under a system in which Senators were elected by state
legislatures (prior to the 17th Amendment), the President would look to the state
legislatures for his authority. At the time, given the difficulty of travel, however, the
state legislatures’ influences would be funneled through Senators in Washington.
17
See Giorgio Pino, Forms and Methods of Constitutional Interpretation –
Italian Style, 1 ROMA TRE LAW REV. 187 (2020) (last visited April 11, 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4008240
[https://perma.cc/FNW7-7EKL].
18
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–77 (1803).
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by lawyers because lawyers are taught that the Constitution is a province
of courts. No first year constitutional law student is unaware of Chief
Justice John Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”19 Lawyers read that to mean that the core function of the
judiciary is to interpret the law, even if the truth is that both the President
and the Congress “interpret” the laws that they make, and do so on a daily
basis. The important point to see is that Marbury’s statement reflects and
reinforces a juridical view of the Constitution. It leads to a vision of the
Constitution as a set of restraints on Congress and the Presidency rather
than constitutive of, or creating, the Congress and the Presidency.

III. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Armed with this understanding of the “constitutive Constitution,” we
can begin to see “institutional” and “political” constraints on
impeachment. In this Part, I explain three features of the structural
Constitution that make impeachment hard, and why it would be hard
whatever the precise legal standard of impeachment—whether it would be
“high
Crimes
and
Misdemeanors”
or
something
like
“maladministration.”20 These features are: (1) collective action by a
majority of the House of Representatives to vote for Articles of
Impeachment; (2) contrary electoral incentives produced by the electoral
relationship between individual House members and their small and local
constituencies;21 and (3) weak parties in a large country.

A. Collective Action
Our Constitution makes it extremely difficult to pass legislation.
Structurally, the Constitution tilts libertarian by requiring bicameral
legislation (agreement of the House and Senate) and Presidential approval.
As we know from the literature on collective action,22 getting lots of

19

Id. at 177.
For the best scholarly treatment of this question, see FRANK BOWMAN III,
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF
TRUMP (2019).
21
All judgments about constituency relationships offered in this Article are
comparative judgments about likely incentives. I make no claim that any of these
relationships “work” in some abstract sense; some members in “safe” seats may
entirely ignore their constituencies. As a relative matter, however, one can say that
the House member’s electoral relationships are more local than those of the President
who speaks to the nation. The member from the 5th of Texas speaks for the 5th of
Texas, not the entire country. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
69 (1991).
22
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
20
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people to act (535 in Congress) imposes serious transaction costs. An easy
experiment proves this: ask a class of one hundred students, or a faculty
meeting of one hundred professors, when to hold a make-up class, and
there will be lots and lots of answers. Coordinated action takes time and
work and makes action less likely. Now consider that the action is far
more important than legislation – it is the unseating of an elected President
– and one begins to see that the passage of Articles of Impeachment is not
a particularly easy thing to do. Over two hundred people, representing
wildly different geographic districts, must agree that impeachment is
appropriate. This helps to explain the one bare fact that we know about
impeachment of Presidents: it has happened very, very rarely.
One might think that because the Speaker largely controls the
contemporary House,23 that collective action problems would be overcome
by strong party leadership. But that assumes that there is no intra-party
dissent within the Speaker’s party about the wisdom of impeachment.
Unseating a President is a major constitutional and political action. Intraparty disagreements on an issue of such magnitude are predictable. Will
the member from Anchorage or Baton Rouge really care? We saw this in
the Trump impeachments. For example, Speaker Nancy Pelosi resisted
the first Articles of Impeachment for a very long time, in part because her
more “moderate” members resisted, questioning whether the action was
worth the trouble: whether voters cared more about their taxes and roads
than about a “divisive” impeachment.24 Of course, recent events – and
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – now tell us that Trump’s call to Ukrainian
President Zelensky to halt aid to Ukraine was one step on the road to war.
But, at the time, when the House was trying to decide whether to impeach
based on Trump’s failure to heed Congress’s instructions on Ukrainian
aid, no one foresaw such events.

SEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 160 (6th ed. 2009) (“The
reinforcement of the Speaker’s powers, beginning in the early 1970s, represents an
important development in the distribution of power in the House.”).
24
See, e.g., Sarah Ferris, Moderate Democrats Warn Pelosi of Impeachment
Obsession, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2019 6:52 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/09/15/moderate-democrats-pelosi-impeachment-1495832
[https://perma.cc/QTP4-6DJY]; Mike Lillis, Pelosi Says Leadership Won’t Pressure
Moderates to Back Impeachment, THE HILL (Dec. 12, 2019, 11:33 AM ET),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/474279-pelosi-says-leadership-wont-pressuremoderates-to-back-impeachment
[https://perma.cc/JAK3-FZFC’]
(“several
moderate members are holding out ahead of the votes amid concerns that backing the
effort might alienate voters in their battleground districts heading into the 2020
election.”).
23
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B. Contrary Vertical Electoral Incentives
So, the first thing making it hard to impeach is that a majority of 435
members of the House must agree. That’s a collective action problem.
Given the importance of impeachment, members are likely to be divided.
A skeptic might ask: Why would they be divided? Wouldn’t party
membership control? The answer is “no.” Enter constitutional structure:
as we will see, it fights against party allegiance. Members’ “electoral
connections” to particular geographic units, whether Detroit or Kansas
City or San Francisco, are set by the Constitution’s requirements.25 These
“electoral connections” easily operate as a disincentive to party unity in a
large country: what Kansas City wants, Detroit or San Francisco may not.
More importantly, those same geographical “electoral connections”
operate as disincentives to impeach. Representatives are elected to lead
and reflect their constituencies.26 The voters are the member’s “boss.”
And, as a general rule, the boss wants House members focused on them –
the voters and their immediate needs (gas prices, infrastructure, jobs,
health care) – as opposed to impeachment. Even if one believes that
representatives simply manipulate ignorant voters, or seek to please party
leaders, there are limits to such strategies: a member who works against
voters’ interests either to privilege party or money takes an electoral risk
that her opponent will win by running on the fact that the member cares
more for party or money than the voters.
To use a spatial analogy, members have a “vertical”27 incentive: the
voters. By contrast, impeachment, and oversight in general, is a
“horizontal” effort: the Congress attempts to control its coequal branch—
the President. Most members will care more about delivering to their
constituents – or funders28 – on issues of the day, from health care to tax
25

This is a staple of basic political science literature. See generally DAVID
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2004). As Douglas Arnold has
argued, members are continually trying to anticipate what their constituencies
want. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 67 (1990)
(explaining that members anticipate and have little trouble “estimating” how
“attentive” publics will react if the member votes against their policy preferences).
Imagine an entirely different view: representatives could represent wealth, not
geography, making the country an aristocracy.
26
This is both a constitutionally created relationship, and a general baseline
assumption of political scientists. See Arnold, supra note 25, at 60 (accepting the
“assumption that the quest for reelection is legislators’ dominant goal”).
27
Although I have used this term, see Vertical Separation, supra note 9, at 752,
it can be found in caselaw. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998)
(Kennedy, J. concurring) (noting that the “[s]eparation of powers operates on a vertical
axis as well, between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be
exercised”).
28
Even if one were to take the posture, given our current campaign finance laws,
that Congress represents monied interests as much as voters, the point would still hold:
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relief, than they will care about impeaching a president for minor errors.
House Members have very little time and are elected every two years,
which means that they have to make hard decisions about what to focus
on. Unless the impeachable conduct is grave, and known to offend their
constituents, it is unlikely that a member’s first priority will be
impeachment if the member seeks reelection. To be sure, members have
a duty to uphold the Constitution and should not forsake that duty for
electoral expedience. Simply because members do not have much of an
electoral incentive to encourage impeachment on weak grounds does not
mean that they have no duty to impeach in cases where there are strong
grounds. But it does suggest that many might find it convenient, or in their
interest, to downplay the severity of ambiguous or insufficiently severe
presidential missteps. Put in other words, doubts are likely to be called
against the constitutional validity of an impeachment.
Those who fear that impeachments will flourish often point to
congressional efforts to harass officials with multiple oversight hearings.
One thinks of the eight House hearings on the handling of an attack on the
United States embassy in Benghazi and the many hours of testimony by
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.29 But, again, this cuts against
rather than for impeachment frenzy. Some members may stake their
electoral fate on executive oversight. But that does not mean that it is in a
majority of members’ interests. In fact, it cannot be because a majority of
members do not have the power to hold hearings in the House; one would
have to be a chairman of a committee to hold such power. In fact, the
availability of oversight “hearings” to expose “executive” misconduct
provides a powerful alternative to impeachment.
Powerful members, like committee chairpersons, who are concerned
about serious and impeachable executive misbehavior have an easier way
to move forward: they may simply hold a hearing on the latest
malfeasance. Consider, for example, the joint Senate-House hearings held
about President Ronald Reagan’s Iran-Contra policies in the 1990s. He
might have been impeached (some of his aides were criminally prosecuted
for theft and basic corruption among other things), but no impeachment
resolution passed. Nevertheless, the highly publicized joint House and
Senate hearings stand as an object lesson for those who would conduct a
secret foreign policy inside the White House against Congress’s expressed
members would be focused on those interests if they wanted to be reelected. There is
no guarantee those interests will support impeachment; as a general matter, corporate
America tends to contribute to both parties and resist government actions that are
divisive or unpredictable as these will upset the markets.
29
Hillary Clinton’s Benghazi Testimony By the Numbers, ABC NEWS (Oct. 22,
2015,
9:16
PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clintons-benghazitestimony-numbers/story?id=34667634 [https://perma.cc/66QB-RYW9] (Stating that
there had been eight congressional investigations into the attack and that then
Secretary of State Clinton had spent eight hours, in one day, testifying).
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wishes.30 More recently (and after I first submitted this Article), the
January 6th Committee to Investigate the Insurrection has reached millions
of people and raised serious questions about the former President’s
conduct. To create such a committee, the Speaker of the House did not
need to convince more than 200 members to impeach.

C. Weak Parties in a Big Country: The Problem of Saliency and the
Need for Ouster
All of this might be different if the country were smaller, or if the
country’s parties were stronger. Let us imagine that the President tasks
the military with moving the Capitol of the State of California from
Sacramento to Los Angeles. Other states might fear similar aggressions,
but some might not care. In Detroit or Kansas City, the voters might be
oblivious: “that’s a California fight,” they might say. Political scientists
have known for decades about “low-information” voters who generally do
not vote on issues because they simply take general “cues” from parties or
other affiliations.31 Americans do not like politics and if something does
not affect them at the proverbial “kitchen table,” they may look the other
way. In short, a big country tends to reduce the saliency, or importance,
of Presidential actions that might be impeachable. For the Congress to act
on impeachment, the President has to do something wrong, that action has
to be widely salient across a large nation, and voters have to agree that it
is so wrong the President should go.32 As long as California, in our case
above, has some other remedy that might be effective – a lawsuit, for
example, or legislation to stop the President from such an action –
members and voters are unlikely to see the need for impeachment.
The Clinton impeachment precisely conveyed these lessons. There
were a majority of members at the time who saw Clinton’s conduct – an
affair with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky – as a gross deviation
from the proper behavior of a President. There was a fair amount of
bipartisan sentiment that the President was deeply wrong to lie about the
affair in a public proceeding under oath. Because it was rather salacious,
the news was widely spread. Congress passed Impeachment articles. But
even if voters knew and disapproved the misconduct, they were divided
30

On the Iran-Contra affair and impeachment, see CHARLES L. BLACK & PHILIP
BOBBITT, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 70–75 (2018).
31
See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 25, 57–58 (discussing how “inattentive
citizens” aggregate information from generalized sources even if they “do not follow
congressional elections very closely.”).
32
This is not to say that there are no constitutional constraints on the House and
Senate conduct of impeachment: there are. Even if everyone in America thought Bill
Clinton should have been ousted from office, there were serious issues about whether
he had committed a “high crime” comparable to the issues raised in prior
impeachments.
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on whether the conduct was sufficiently severe to merit presidential ouster.
Was the country really in danger? That is the question that members and
voters must answer. Ultimately, and predictably given the high 2/3 vote
requirement for conviction, the Senate refused to oust Clinton from office.
Perhaps more importantly for future impeachments, impeaching party
members were punished at the polls for wasting voters’ time. The
generally accepted wisdom of the Clinton impeachment was that
Republicans should have spent less time on impeachment and more time
tending to their local constituencies.33

IV. THE FUTURE OF IMPEACHMENT
Now that we’ve had an impeachment of a President no longer in
office, some have worried that the House might vote to impeach former
officials other than the President, such as President Obama’s Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton or President Trump’s Attorney General William
Barr. The first question this raises is whether such action follows from the
second Trump impeachment. The second question is whether such
impeachments are likely.
On the first question, it is important to recognize that the second
Trump impeachment was not a classic “late” impeachment.34 Trump was
impeached for conduct while in office (the insurrection occurred after the
2020 election and before the inauguration of President Biden).35 The
Senate refused to hold the trial while Trump was in office, however.36 In
short, in my view, the second Trump impeachment was not a late
impeachment, it was a late impeachment trial. The House impeached
President Trump for his role in the capitol insurrection while he was still
in office.37 That is a far cry from attempting to impeach those who have
been out of office for years, on the theory that they committed wrongs in
33

Russell Riley, The Clinton Impeachment and Its Fallout, THE MILLER CTR. AT
UNIV. OF VA., https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/impeachment/clintonimpeachment-and-its-fallout [https://perma.cc/J4GK-8ELY] (last visited May 29,
2022) (stating that the Republican “party actually lost five seats in the House while
gaining no Senate seats in the November 1998 elections conducted just prior to the
impeachment vote. Traditionally, the opposition party registers significant gains in the
off-year elections of a President's second term, and so the Republican loss was
virtually unprecedented”).
34
For the most comprehensive and best treatment of so-called “late
impeachments,” see Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachment of
Former Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, the History, and Practice of Late
Impeachment, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 13 (2001).
35
Nicholas Fandos, Trump Impeached for Inciting Insurrection, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/us/politics/trumpimpeached.html [https://perma.cc/27AL-CSPE].
36
Id.
37
Id.
THE
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the past and should be barred from future office. Moreover, if Speaker
Pelosi is right that the Senate intentionally delayed the proceedings,38 then
it is even less of a precedent than it might otherwise appear for impeaching
former officials.
More importantly, however venomous the anger at particular
officials, members of Congress are likely to believe that they have more
important things to do if they want to be reelected. To be sure, individual
members may file a resolution to impeach. But only collective action
counts. There has to be a majority of members who see it in their electoral
interest to take the time to impeach. A Judiciary committee of two dozen
members might pass Articles, but over two hundred members –
representing constituents from rural Kansas to urban Miami – would all
have to think it worth their time to engage in such a political process when
there are likely to be more important things requiring attention in rural
Kansas and urban Miami from the voters’ perspectives: for example,
roads, schools, guns, housing, or COVID-19. If the Trump impeachments
tell us anything, it is that when the conduct is not as serious as an armed
insurrection (a literally unprecedented event in our history), at least some
members will fear that they will risk punishment at the polls for engaging
in divisive Washington-based politics. Certainly, that is what some
members thought about the first Trump impeachment.39
To be sure, the more divided the country, the more likely it is that
parties will increase in strength and unity due, in large part, to partisan
gerrymandering at the state level. A House of Representatives in which a
bare majority of members aligned with Republicans would have the power
to impeach President Biden and former government officials, but it is
highly unlikely that they would find it in their electoral interest to spend
precious time doing it. In any large group, there will be those who prefer
to focus on other issues (i.e. fighting transgender bathrooms or child
pornography), thinking those issues were more likely to gain them
reelection than a time-intensive Beltway fight against officials long gone

38

Speaker Pelosi (D–CA) publicly claimed that the Senate Leader, Mitch
McConnell (R–KY) had purposefully delayed the trial while Trump was in
office. Lisa Hagen, McConnell Tears into Trump Over Riots, While Pelosi Blames
GOP Leader for Delay of Trial, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 13, 2021),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-02-13/mcconnell-tears-intotrump-over-riots-while-pelosi-blames-gop-leader-for-delay-of-trial (“It is so pathetic
that Sen. McConnell kept the Senate shut down so that the Senate could not receive
the article of impeachment and has used that as his excuse for not voting to convict
Donald Trump.”).
39
See supra note 24 (discussing moderate House Democrats’ hostility to the first
Trump impeachment); see also NORM EISEN, A CASE FOR THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE: THE UNITED STATES V. DONALD J. TRUMP 171 (2020) (insider account stating
that Speaker Pelosi was “highly influenced” by what Members called the “majority
makers”—those Members seeking reelection from vulnerable purple or red districts).
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from office. For example, President Trump’s supporters would face
questions at home about why they were not spending more time on
pressing local issues, like critical infrastructure or lowering taxes. To be
sure, impeachment fervor increases with increasing party divisions.
Actual impeachments have increased over time, in my view, because there
are increasingly few “purple” seats in the House, districts where the
constituencies are reliably mixed among the parties. One lesson this
teaches: If you want to prevent impeachment fury, you should push hard
against partisan gerrymandering,40 which has increasingly narrowed the
band of House seats that are competitive between republicans and
democrats.
The bottom line: the Constitution’s institutional structure governs by
geography, not party. At some point, party can overcome the pull of
individual incentives. But, absent universally condemned conduct,
geography (and personal electoral self-interest) provides an incentive to
resist impeachment. Only under two conditions would this change: (1) a
dramatic party split (say 60/40) supporting same-party domination in the
House and Senate; and (2) a willingness by members to bet their political
future on divisiveness. Now, some may say that could happen, given
former President Trump’s incendiary rhetoric and support for an
insurrection; disruption may be the point of some members of the modern
Republican party. But even in the highly implausible scenario of a large
Trump super-majority in both the House and the Senate, there would still
be counterincentives. Such a super-majority would have to balance the
time it would spend on impeachment against the cost of time lost effecting
radical legislative change (think abortion and immigration—top Trump
party issues). Some members may prefer to spend their time on those
issues rather than on a costly Washington fight.
Enter the final two pieces of the structural Constitution providing an
incentive against impeachment. First, the Constitution’s 2/3 conviction
rule. Even if the House has a super-majority desiring impeachment, the
likelihood of a Senate conviction remains low (the larger state geographies
in the Senate make it much more likely that the members are not as wedded
to party outliers). As long as at least 1/3 of the Senate members are from
a non-Trump party, then impeachment will be a dead end. All those House
members who wish to impeach will be asked, by reporters, their
constituents, and their fellow members, why they are engaging in a process
that will never convict. This occurred in the first Trump impeachment on
the then-theory that the call to President Zelensky was simply too complex

40

For a recent and general overview on this topic, see Eric McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and Political Science, 23 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 171 (2020). On the
negative downstream political effects on congressional voting, see Nicholas
Stephanopoulos & Christopher Warshaw, The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering on
Political Parties, 45 LEGAL STUD. Q. 609 (2020).
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for the average American to understand. Second, there are constitutional
rules limiting impeachment. Just because a super-majority of the House
may wish for an impeachment trial does not mean that they have the proper
legal grounds: precedent suggests that whatever a “high Crime” is, it needs
to be something big enough to put the country at risk. And, here again,
House partisans will face the kinds of questions faced by Republicans who
impeached President Clinton and by Democrats in the first Trump
impeachment41: was there really a high crime here, and if there was not,
why not stick to doing business for the people?

V. CONCLUSION
No one can deny that we live in an age of impeachment not seen by
the greatest generation who survived World War II. There have been three
times as many impeachment trials – exactly three – in my lifetime than in
my parents’ much longer lives. People fear that we will continue to see
impeachments break out in increasing intensity. They should be worried,
given the country’s deep partisan divisions, the increasing nationalization
of local politics, and the capacity of the internet to spread hate at the speed
of light. Earnest work should be done, on main street, in churches, and in
law schools, to try to heal the wounds of a divided country, siloed by real
disease (COVID-19), fake news, and gerrymandered districts. But there
are reasons for hope that impeachment will remain rare. As I have tried to
explain in this Article, our Constitution includes structures that resist
impeachment—namely it enshrines local geography as a key reason for
and against political action. In normal times, history tells us that this
makes political action difficult, but it also works to resist the passions of
party and faction.

41

In my own view, history has supported the importance of the first
impeachment, particularly given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, those
who oppose impeachment often do so on the ground that the conduct is not sufficiently
severe or nation-threatening.
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